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Abstract—Business process management (BPM) and accompa-
nying systems aim at enabling enterprises to become adaptive.
In spite of the dependency of enterprises on secure business
processes, BPM languages and techniques provide only little
support for security. Several complementary approaches have
been proposed for security in the domain of BPM. Nevertheless,
support for a systematic procedure for the development of secure
electronic business processes is still missing. In this paper, we
pinpoint the need for a security engineering process model in the
domain of BPM and identify key requirements for such process
model.
Index Terms—security engineering; process model; require-
ments, business process management
I. INTRODUCTION
Business processes are the way organizations do their work
– a set of activities carried out to accomplish a defined
objective. Therefore, the design, administration, enactment,
and analysis of business processes – subsumed under the term
business process management (BPM) – are vital challenges to
organizations. Business process management systems (BPMS)
are seen as important facilitators for the necessary alignment
of people and organizational resources. BPMSs enable organi-
zations to become adaptive enterprises: They allow for a faster
reaction to environmental and market changes and support
proactive innovation of products and services. [1, 2]
Consequently, BPM supported by information systems has
seen an ongoing development in the last decades. With re-
spect to modeling languages and techniques, a multitude of
approaches has been introduced. At the same time, BPMS
developed from simple information systems to capture and
administrate process models to feature-rich BPM suites that
support also simulation, execution, and controlling of business
process instances. Hence, the ability for organizations to man-
age business processes is well supported by today’s software
industry. [3]
Business processes are closely connected with assets of
the respective organization. Observation, manipulation, and
disruption of business processes might threaten these assets
or even the existence of the organization itself. Thus, security
of business processes ought to be of high importance for
every organization. But in spite of this dependence on secure
business processes, BPM languages and techniques provide
only little support to express security needs or controls applied.
II. SECURITY AND ELECTRONIC BUSINESS PROCESSES
In reaction to this need, several approaches have been
developed to support security in the context of BPM. Most
approaches address one of two issues: the analysis of security
(and safety) properties of business process models or the spec-
ification of security requirements and controls for electronic
business processes [4].
By contrast, the support for a systematic procedure to
develop secure electronic business processes is weak. The few
existing approaches do not address actual runtime environ-
ments and enforceable controls [5, 6], support only specific
activities like security requirements engineering [7, 8], or do
not provide any guidance for their application [9]. Also general
approaches applied to electronic business processes display
similar issues [10].
This situation might be attributed to security engineering
in general: As a discipline – commonly defined as “building
systems to remain dependable in the face of malice, error, or
mischance” [11] – it is considered to be still in its infancy.
At present, mostly top-down approaches from the software
engineering domain are adopted and enhanced with security-
specific technologies and methods.
With regard to BPM, lack of support for security engi-
neering is endangering one of its main objectives: allowing
enterprises to react faster and to continuously innovate prod-
ucts and services. Currently, enterprises either have to choose
to focus on the protection of their assets or to develop and
deploy their electronic business processes with little security
expertise and support by applicable methods. The first op-
tion requires security professionals to secure the electronic
business processes individually and manually which implies
investments in terms of time and money and threatens the
adaptability gained with the application of BPMS. The second
option exposes the enterprises’ assets to malice and mischance.
Industrial experiences from our Security Test Lab as well
as academic studies analyzing industrial security engineering
practices indicate that enterprises tend to choose the latter
option [12].
III. REQUIREMENTS FOR A SECURITY ENGINEERING
PROCESS MODEL ADDRESSING BPM
As a first step to bridge the gap between (executable) busi-
ness process models and secure electronic business processes,
we provide a set of requirements for a security engineering
process model in the domain of BPM. These requirements
stem from fundamental ideas of BPM: separation of tech-
nical and domain aspects (allowing domain experts to work
largely independently from developers), independence from
development methodologies, and applicability notwithstanding
environmental heterogeneity.
Key issues for a general security engineering process model
are separation of requirements and controls, traceability, cor-
rectness, completeness, and iterative applicability on different
levels of abstraction. Core activities encompass security re-
quirements elicitation, threat modeling and evaluation, control
design, and validation. [13]
To align a security engineering process model with BPM
we identify the following requirements:
1) Separation of (initial) activities for security professionals
and (recurring) activities for security nonprofessionals
2) Consistent coverage of all activities with detailed guid-
ance
3) Utilization of models and adequate tooling to separate
the security analysis from design and implementation
4) Possibility to integrate the security engineering process
model with different development approaches
We envision a security engineering process model that aids
security professionals to prepare an environment for domain
experts, providing common threats, evaluation criteria, and
their countermeasures supported by business process engines.
The security engineering process model supports domain ex-
perts to identify and evaluate security requirements utilizing
business process models as primary input, to select from
a restricted set of applicable controls, and to configure the
business process engines correspondingly.
IV. CONCLUSION
BPMS enable enterprises to become adaptive and are well
supported by today’s software industry. Although an active
research community proposed several approaches to address
the need for security in the domain of BPM, support for a
systematic procedure for the development of secure electronic
business processes is still missing. We identify four key
requirements for a security engineering process model that is
able to bridge the gap between (executable) business process
models and secure electronic business processes. Currently we
are working on such a process model as well as supporting
modeling languages and tooling.
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